@revealui/contracts
Unified contracts package for RevealUI - schemas, validation, and type safety across the stack
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from revealui-org to GitHub Actions as part of a CI/CD migration; SLSA provenance attestation confirms builds are tied to the official RevealUIStudio/revealui repo. This transition is legitimate and expected to persist. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New files are TypeScript declaration files (.d.ts) for a contracts/schema package. Large type definition files are expected as the package grows its API surface; no executable or obfuscated code flagged. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.3.7 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.3.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.3.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.3.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.3.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.3.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.2.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 6 |
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.