@revealui/mcp
Model Context Protocol integrations for RevealUI — adapter framework, hypervisor, and MCP contracts
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): env passed to spawned MCP child process, standard subprocess launch pattern; not remote exfil. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; provenance improved, benign for this org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps are all @revealui/* first-party packages, consistent with monorepo expansion. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@revealui/knowledge-graph | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package in same monorepo/org, not an unrelated third-party dep. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Growth driven by generated .d.ts contracts file and added first-party features, not obfuscated payload. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore provenance is common (~88% of npm packages) and not a disqualifier for this package's risk profile. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv | AI (phantom-deps): dotenv is declared in package.json dependencies and used in config files; false positive common in configuration-heavy packages. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped @revealui package with clear identity, GitHub repo, and commercial homepage. No plausible impersonation of 'yup'; edit distance of 2 is coincidental. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@revealui/contracts | AI (dependencies): First-party monorepo dependency from the same @revealui org; not a third-party risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@revealui/config | AI (dependencies): First-party monorepo dependency from the same @revealui org; not a third-party risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@revealui/core | AI (dependencies): First-party monorepo dependency from the same @revealui org; not a third-party risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.3 | 10 / 5 | |
| 0.8.2 | 10 / 5 | |
| 0.8.1 | 10 / 4 | |
| 0.8.0 | 10 / 4 | |
| 0.7.1 | 9 / 4 | |
| 0.7.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.6.2 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.6.1 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.6.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.4.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.1.11 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.1.10 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.1.9 | 6 / 4 | |
| 0.1.8 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.7 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.5 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 6 / 4 |
v0.8.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (revealui-org) on 2026-07-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (revealui-org) on 2026-06-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (revealui-org) on 2026-05-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.3.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (revealui-org) on 2026-05-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.