@revealui/security
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is backed by SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with org-managed CI/CD publishing. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of provenance is common across npm ecosystem (~88% of packages); no other risk signals elevate this to a concern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@revealui/utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dependency; phantom import pattern is expected for internal packages used in type declarations or transitively. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@revealui/contracts | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dependency; phantom import pattern is expected for internal contract/type packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.3.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.6 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.5 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 5 |
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.