@ridit/hackclub-ai-sdk
One key. Every model. Hack Club powered.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decoding a data URI image to write to disk; not a malicious payload pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ridit/hackclub-ai-sdk | AI (phantom-deps): Self-referential phantom dep in same org scope; likely a versioning artifact, not a real concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 1 |
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.