@rjsf/antd
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from rjsf-bot to GitHub Actions CI is a documented CI migration; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established monorepo package; dormancy reflects release cadence, not abandonment or takeover. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:rc-picker | AI (phantom-deps): rc-picker is a declared runtime dep used transitively via antd/dayjs integration; false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.6.2 | 4 / 9 | |
| 6.6.1 | 4 / 9 | |
| 6.6.0 | 4 / 9 | |
| 6.5.3 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.5.2 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.5.1 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.5.0 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.4.2 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.4.1 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.4.0 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.3.1 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.3.0 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.2.5 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.2.4 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.2.3 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.1.2 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.1.1 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.1.0 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.0.2 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.0.1 | 4 / 10 | |
| 6.0.0 | 4 / 10 |
v6.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.