@robot-resources/scraper
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package published via GitHub Actions with a legitimate repo; lack of Sigstore attestation is a process gap, not a security indicator for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 0.4.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 0.3.1 | 6 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 0.1.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 6 |
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.