@rocket.chat/core-typings
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@rocket.chat/icons | AI (dependencies): First-party Rocket.Chat monorepo sibling; expected dependency for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@rocket.chat/ui-kit | AI (dependencies): First-party Rocket.Chat monorepo sibling; expected dependency for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@rocket.chat/message-parser | AI (dependencies): First-party Rocket.Chat monorepo sibling; expected dependency for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal monorepo typings package; missing metadata is expected for this package type. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Monorepo internal package; missing description is consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Rocket.Chat package predating provenance attestation adoption. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.4.3 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.4.2 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.4.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.4.0 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.3.5 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.3.4 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.3.3 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.3.2 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.3.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 8.3.0 | 5 / 9 |
v8.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.4.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (gazzo) than the most recent previously approved version (rocketchat-buildmaster) on 2026-05-22, but gazzo is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v8.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.