@rocket.chat/fuselage-forms
A set of component wrappers to provide ease of use and accessibility out-of-box.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@rocket.chat/emitter | AI (dependencies): First-party Rocket.Chat org dependency; stable pattern for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Rocket.Chat monorepo package; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 28 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 28 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 28 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 27 |
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.