@rocket.chat/icons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped @rocket.chat package; no relation to cors. Levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.48.0 | 0 / 9 | |
| 0.47.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.46.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.45.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 0.44.0 | 0 / 10 |
v0.48.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (tassoevan) than the most recent previously approved version (dougfabris) on 2026-05-27, but tassoevan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.47.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.46.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.45.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.44.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.