@roj-ai/standalone-server
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Standard pattern for passing env to git subprocess; not exfiltration. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): JWT URL-safe base64 decode helper; no malicious payload. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): 127.0.0.1 is localhost; this is a local proxy server by design, not a suspicious external IP. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@roj-ai/client | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package; likely re-exported or used indirectly via build output. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@roj-ai/shared | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package; likely re-exported or used indirectly via build output. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.22 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.21 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.20 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.19 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.18 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.17 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.16 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.15 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.14 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.13 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.12 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.11 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.10 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.9 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.8 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.7 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.6 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.5 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.4 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 5 / 2 |
v0.1.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.19
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.18
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.16
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.14
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.13
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 172 | opts: { cwd?: string; input?: string; env?: Record<string, string> } = {}, 173 | ): Promise<string> { > 174 | const env = opts.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : process.env 175 | const child = execFileAsync('git', args, { cwd: opts.cwd, env }) 176 | if (opts.input !== undefined) {
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.