@roll-agent/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package has SLSA provenance attestation via Sigstore; missing gitHead is superseded by stronger attestation signal. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped org package with valid repo/homepage; missing description is cosmetic, not a malice indicator here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:chalk | AI (phantom-deps): Same as above — CLI tool pattern; chalk likely used in runtime output paths not statically imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:cli-table3 | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool pattern; may be used in runtime paths not statically detected. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:gray-matter | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool pattern; may be used in runtime paths not statically detected. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): @roll-agent/core is a scoped AI agent CLI package, not a typosquat of the 'cors' middleware; name similarity is coincidental. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-sdk/alibaba | AI (phantom-deps): Same as above. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-sdk/deepseek | AI (phantom-deps): Same as above. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-sdk/anthropic | AI (phantom-deps): Same as above. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ai-sdk/openai | AI (phantom-deps): AI SDK providers likely loaded dynamically based on config; phantom-dep heuristic not reliable here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:yaml | AI (phantom-deps): Phantom-dep heuristic false positive; declared deps may be used at runtime via dynamic imports or CLI config loading. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.7 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.6.6 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.6.5 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.6.4 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.6.2 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.6.1 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.6.0 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.5.2 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.5.1 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.5.0 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.4.0 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.3.3 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.3.2 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.3.1 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.2.2 | 14 / 1 | |
| 0.2.1 | 13 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 13 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 13 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 13 / 1 |
v0.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.