@rolldown/binding-openharmony-arm64
Fast JavaScript/TypeScript bundler in Rust with Rollup-compatible API.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Native .node binding is the entire purpose of this platform-specific package; SLSA provenance confirms CI/CD build integrity. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binding packages legitimately have no deps and minimal READMEs; not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rolldown-binding.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rolldown-binding.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rolldown-binding.openharmony-arm64.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.