@rollup/rollup-android-arm-eabi
Native bindings for Rollup
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the intended artifact, published with SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary-only package; no deps, keywords, or usage docs are expected for this type of package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 54)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.61.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.60.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.60.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.60.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.60.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.60.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.58.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.57.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.57.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.56.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.55.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.55.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.55.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.55.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.54.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.53.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.53.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.53.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.53.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.53.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.53.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.52.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.52.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.52.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.52.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.52.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.52.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.51.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.50.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.50.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.50.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.49.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.48.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.48.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.47.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.47.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.46.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.46.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.46.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.46.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.46.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.45.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.45.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.45.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.44.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.44.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.44.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.43.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.42.0 | 0 / 0 |
v4.61.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.60.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.60.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.60.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.60.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.60.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.59.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.59.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.58.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.57.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.57.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.56.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.55.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.55.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.55.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.55.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.54.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.53.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.53.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.53.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.53.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.53.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.53.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.52.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.52.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.52.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.52.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.52.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.52.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.51.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.50.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.50.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.50.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.49.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.48.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.48.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.47.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.47.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.46.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.46.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.46.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.46.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.46.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.45.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.45.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.45.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.44.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.44.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.44.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.43.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.42.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rollup.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.