@rslint/core MIT 40 versions

@rslint/core

npm Repository Homepage

rslint core library

40

Versions

MIT

License

No

Install Scripts

Verified

Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

chenjiahansenze.fanhardfist3

Keywords

rslintlintertypescriptgo

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
provenance	slsa-provenance	AI (provenance): Package consistently published via CI/CD with SLSA provenance; stable signal for this package.	ai	2026/06/12
source-diff	source-size-tripled	AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by bundling native bindings into eslint-plugin dist; consistent with added @rslint/native dependency.	ai	2026/06/12
provenance	publisher-changed	AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA attestation is a legitimate CI/CD automation pattern for this package.	ai	2026/05/18
semgrep	semgrep:child-process-import	AI (semgrep): CLI launcher invoking a platform-specific Go binary via execFileSync; stable pattern for this package.	ai	2026/05/03
typosquat	typosquat.levenshtein:cors	AI (typosquat): @rslint/core is a scoped linter package; Levenshtein match to 'cors' is a false positive with no semantic similarity.	ai	2026/04/29

Versions (showing 40 of 40)

Version	Deps	Published
0.6.5	1 / 15	2026-07-07
0.6.4	1 / 15	2026-06-30
0.6.3	1 / 15	2026-06-24
0.6.2	1 / 15	2026-06-17
0.6.0	2 / 15	2026-06-11
0.5.3	2 / 5	2026-05-14
0.5.2	2 / 5	2026-05-07
0.5.1	2 / 5	2026-04-27
0.5.0	1 / 5	2026-04-22
0.4.2	1 / 5	2026-04-13
0.4.1	1 / 5	2026-04-09
0.4.0	1 / 5	2026-04-09
0.3.4	0 / 4	2026-03-31
0.3.3	0 / 4	2026-03-27
0.3.2	0 / 4	2026-03-24
0.3.1	0 / 4	2026-03-18
0.3.0	0 / 4	2026-03-18
0.2.3	0 / 4	2026-03-11
0.2.2	0 / 4	2026-03-09
0.2.1	0 / 4	2026-02-09
0.2.0	0 / 4	2026-01-15
0.1.14	0 / 4	2025-12-05
0.1.13	0 / 3	2025-09-04
0.1.12	0 / 2	2025-08-22
0.1.11	0 / 2	2025-08-15
0.1.10	0 / 2	2025-08-14
0.1.9	0 / 2	2025-08-13
0.1.8	0 / 2	2025-08-11
0.1.7	0 / 2	2025-08-08
0.1.6	0 / 2	2025-08-08
0.1.5	0 / 2	2025-08-06
0.1.4	0 / 2	2025-08-05
0.1.3	0 / 2	2025-08-03
0.1.2	0 / 2	2025-08-03
0.1.1	0 / 2	2025-08-01
0.1.0	0 / 2	2025-07-31
0.0.20	0 / 2	2025-07-31
0.0.15	0 / 2	2025-07-28
0.0.14	0 / 2	2025-07-28
0.0.12	0 / 2	2025-07-28

v0.6.5

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.4

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.3

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.2

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.0

1 finding

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.13

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-09-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.12

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.11

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.10

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.9

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.8

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.7

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.6

2 findings

HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.5

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.4

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.3

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.2

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.1

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.0

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.20

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.15

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.14

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.12

1 finding

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.