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@rslint/linux-arm64

binary for rslint

10
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

chenjiahanhardfist

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; transition from human publisher to GHA is expected for this repo. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI-attested release is consistent with infrequent binary releases for this tool. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary package legitimately has no JS deps, no keywords, and tiny payload. ai

Versions (showing 10 of 10)

Version Deps Published
0.5.3 0 / 0
0.5.2 0 / 0
0.5.1 0 / 0
0.5.0 0 / 0
0.4.2 0 / 0
0.4.1 0 / 0
0.4.0 0 / 0
0.3.4 0 / 0
0.1.2 0 / 0
0.0.20 0 / 0

v0.5.3

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.4.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.4.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: hardfist → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-31) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.20

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.