@rspack/cli
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase from inlining jiti+babel as compiled dependencies instead of runtime deps. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:compiled/jiti/dist/babel.cjs | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled @babel/core for jiti; standard prebundled dependency pattern for this CLI package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:compiled/jiti/dist/jiti.cjs | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled jiti distribution; standard prebundled dependency pattern for this CLI package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:compiled/jiti/dist/babel.cjs | AI (source-diff): Babel core bundle naturally contains dynamic require + module resolution; not malicious network/exec. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Rspack migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance attestation — this is an expected, legitimate automation transition for a mature open-source project. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): pirates is a well-known, legitimate require-hook package replacing interpret/rechoir; benign dependency swap consistent with the package's purpose. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): @rspack/cli is the official CLI for the Rspack bundler, not a typosquat of 'joi'. The levenshtein match is spurious for this scoped package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): hardfist and chenjiahan are known Rspack/ByteDance engineers; spam flag is a false positive. Package is a legitimate, established CLI tool with 1191 versions and SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 114)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.4 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.1.3 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.1.2 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.1.1 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.8 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.7 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.6 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.5 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.4 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 14 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 14 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 13 | |
| 1.7.12 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.11 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.10 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.9 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.8 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.7 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.6 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.5 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.4 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.3 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.2 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.1 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.7.0 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.8 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.7 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.6 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.5 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.4 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.3 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.2 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.1 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.6.0 | 4 / 12 | |
| 1.5.8 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.7 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.6 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.5 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.4 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.3 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.2 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.5.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.4.11 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.10 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.9 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.8 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.7 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.6 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.5 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.4 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.3 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.2 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.1 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.4.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.15 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.14 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.13 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.12 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.11 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.10 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.9 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.8 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.7 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.6 | 8 / 11 | |
| 1.3.5 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.3.4 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.3.3 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.3.2 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.3.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.3.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.8 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.7 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.6 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.5 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.4 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.3 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.2 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.2.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 1.1.8 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.1.6 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.1.5 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.1.4 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.1.3 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.1.2 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.1.1 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.1.0 | 9 / 13 | |
| 1.0.14 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.13 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.12 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.11 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.10 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.9 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.8 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.7 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.6 | 9 / 12 | |
| 1.0.5 | 9 / 12 |
v2.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.