@rudderjs/horizon
Queue monitoring dashboard for RudderJS — tracks job lifecycle, queue metrics, and worker status with a built-in UI.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): New org/publisher; absence of provenance is common and no other risk signals present. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@rudderjs/contracts | AI (phantom-deps): @rudderjs/contracts is declared in dependencies; phantom-dep is a false positive for this monorepo package. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.2.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 6.1.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 6.1.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 6.1.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 6.0.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.0.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.0.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 5.0.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 4.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 3.0.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 3.0.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 3 / 3 |
v6.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.