@rzl-zone/build-tools-cli
CLI for Build Tools to standardize and improve TypeScript and JavaScript build outputs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/internal-ClMa7lQy.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified bundle output from tsdown build tool; consistent with this package's build pattern across versions. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/internal-DKEi-69M.cjs | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown/rollup CJS bundle output; minified but not obfuscated, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/internal-1BCwjj51.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output (tsdown); content is readable CLI utility code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/internal-BRttxKTV.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified CJS bundle output from tsdown; readable logic, no malicious patterns, SLSA-attested build. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/internal-B9grrnTJ.cjs | AI (source-diff): Standard tsdown/rollup CJS bundle output; long lines are minified but readable, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/internal-Cb9CWSvN.cjs | AI (source-diff): Content-hash named bundler chunk (tsdown); sample shows readable CLI utility code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): commander is a declared runtime dep used by CLI binaries; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@rzl-zone/build-tools | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this monorepo-style package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@rzl-zone/node-only | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep used transitively by CLI tooling; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.12 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.11 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.10 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.9 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.8 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.7 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.6 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.5 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.0.4 | 3 / 5 |
v0.0.12
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.