@safe-global/safe-apps-provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate maintainer transition within Safe org; new publishers are org members. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Safe team members added to official scoped package; benign handoff. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Safe Global packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this org. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.18.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.18.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.18.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.18.3 | 2 / 0 |
v0.18.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.18.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.18.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.