@salesforce/o11y-reporter
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:o11y | AI (dependencies): o11y is Salesforce's own observability library; this package is explicitly a wrapper around it. Dependency is expected and legitimate for all versions of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:o11y_schema | AI (dependencies): o11y_schema is Salesforce's own observability schema library; this package is explicitly a wrapper around it. Dependency is expected and legitimate for all versions of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is published via GitHub Actions CI/CD under the @salesforce scope; lack of Sigstore provenance is acceptable given the automated publishing pipeline and established package history. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.8.4 | 2 / 18 | |
| 1.8.3 | 2 / 18 | |
| 1.8.2 | 2 / 18 | |
| 1.8.1 | 2 / 18 | |
| 1.8.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.7.4 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.7.3 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.7.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.6.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.4.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.3.4 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.3.3 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.3.2 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.3.1 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 17 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 17 |
v1.8.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.