@sap-ux/abap-deploy-config-sub-generator
Sub generator for ABAP deployment configuration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): sap-ospo-admin is SAP's OSS admin account; addition is consistent with SAP org governance, not a compromise signal. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): SAP open-ux-tools migrated to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA attestation; this is the expected CI/CD pattern for this org. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap-ux/ui5-config | AI (dependencies): Same SAP org scope; sibling package in the open-ux-tools monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap-ux/adp-tooling | AI (dependencies): Same SAP org scope; sibling package in the open-ux-tools monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap-ux/feature-toggle | AI (dependencies): Same SAP org scope; sibling package in the open-ux-tools monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap-devx/yeoman-ui-types | AI (dependencies): SAP-devx org scope; consistent with SAP tooling ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): SAP open-ux-tools monorepo does not publish with Sigstore provenance; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap-ux/axios-extension | AI (dependencies): Same SAP org scope; sibling package in the open-ux-tools monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap-ux/btp-utils | AI (dependencies): Same SAP org scope; sibling package in the open-ux-tools monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sap-ux/logger | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep in a monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 236)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.10 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.9 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.8 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.7 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.6 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.4 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.3 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.1 | 13 / 12 | |
| 1.0.0 | 13 / 12 | |
| 0.4.11 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.10 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.9 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.7 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.6 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.5 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.3 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.2 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.4.1 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.34 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.33 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.32 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.31 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.29 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.28 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.27 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.26 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.25 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.24 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.23 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.22 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.21 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.20 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.19 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.18 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.17 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.16 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.15 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.14 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.13 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.12 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.11 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.10 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.9 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.8 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.7 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.6 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.5 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.4 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.3 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.2 | 13 / 10 | |
| 0.3.1 | 13 / 10 |
v1.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.33
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.