@sap-ux/btp-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): SAP migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; stable for this package going forward. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): sap-ospo-admin is SAP's OSS admin account; legitimate org-level maintainer addition. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SAP org package with 30 approved dependents and clean diff; dormancy reflects org release cadence, not takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap/bas-sdk | AI (dependencies): First-party SAP BAS SDK; expected dependency for a BTP utilities package in the SAP ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established SAP org package; provenance absence is consistent across all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 1.2.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.2.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.15 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.14 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.13 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.12 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.11 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.10 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.9 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.8 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.7 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 2 |
v2.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.