@sap-ux/cards-editor-config-writer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): SAP internal tooling package; sparse README/keywords is typical for monorepo sub-packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.5.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.5.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.5.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 3 |
v0.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.