@sap-ux/fiori-generator-shared
Commonly used shared functionality and types to support the fiori generator.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:mem-fs-editor | AI (dependencies): mem-fs-editor is a standard Yeoman/generator ecosystem dependency; appropriate for this SAP Fiori generator package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): SAP internal tooling package; sparse README and no keywords are expected for this type of library. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from individual to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; standard for SAP org packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:mem-fs | AI (phantom-deps): mem-fs is explicitly declared as a runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.6 | 10 / 10 | |
| 1.0.5 | 10 / 10 | |
| 1.0.3 | 10 / 10 | |
| 1.0.2 | 10 / 10 | |
| 1.0.1 | 10 / 10 | |
| 1.0.0 | 10 / 10 | |
| 0.15.6 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.15.4 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.15.3 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.15.2 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.15.1 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.14.1 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.14.0 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.13.105 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.13.104 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.13.103 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.13.102 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.13.94 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.13.66 | 10 / 9 | |
| 0.13.14 | 10 / 7 | |
| 0.13.13 | 10 / 7 | |
| 0.13.1 | 10 / 6 |
v1.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.105
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.104
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.103
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.94
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.66
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.