@sap-ux/ui5-test-writer
SAP UI5 tests writer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI is expected for SAP monorepo; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @sap-ux/preview-middleware is a first-party SAP UX package from the same monorepo; low risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): SAP open-ux-tools monorepo; provenance not configured but package is well-established and low-risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ejs | AI (phantom-deps): ejs is a declared runtime dep used via EJS template rendering; phantom-dep heuristic misfires here. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 132)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.10 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.9 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.8 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.6 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.5 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.4 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.2 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.1 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1.0.0 | 12 / 9 | |
| 0.9.15 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.14 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.13 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.11 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.10 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.8 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.7 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.5 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.4 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.3 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.9.2 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.7.113 | 11 / 8 | |
| 0.7.112 | 11 / 8 | |
| 0.7.111 | 11 / 8 | |
| 0.7.110 | 11 / 8 | |
| 0.7.109 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.108 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.107 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.106 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.105 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.104 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.103 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.102 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.101 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.100 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.99 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.98 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.97 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.96 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.95 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.94 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.93 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.92 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.91 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.90 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.7.89 | 8 / 7 | |
| 0.7.88 | 8 / 7 | |
| 0.7.87 | 8 / 7 | |
| 0.7.86 | 8 / 7 | |
| 0.7.85 | 8 / 7 | |
| 0.7.84 | 8 / 7 | |
| 0.7.83 | 8 / 7 |
v1.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on unknown date. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on unknown date. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.113
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.112
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.111
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.110
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.109
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.108
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.106
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.105
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.104
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.103
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.102
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.101
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.100
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.99
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.98
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.97
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.96
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.95
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.94
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.93
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.92
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.91
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.90
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.89
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devinea) than the most recent previously approved version (kranthie.sap) on 2026-03-18, but devinea is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.88
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devinea) than the most recent previously approved version (kranthie.sap) on 2026-03-17, but devinea is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.87
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (devinea) than the most recent previously approved version (kranthie.sap) on 2026-03-16, but devinea is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.86
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.85
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.84
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.83
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.