@sap/swa-for-sapbas-vsx
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sap/bas-sdk | AI (dependencies): First-party SAP dependency consistent with this SAP package's purpose; stable across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established SAP package; lack of Sigstore provenance is consistent across all 30 versions and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.16 | 3 / 20 | |
| 2.0.15 | 3 / 20 | |
| 2.0.13 | 3 / 20 | |
| 2.0.11 | 3 / 20 |
v2.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.