@sasjs/cli
Command line interface for SASjs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established SASjs org package; lack of Sigstore attestation is a process gap, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:preinstall | AI (install-scripts): Preinstall only echoes a node version warning message; no network calls or code execution risk. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @sasjs/cli package with 421 versions and established org; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:find | AI (phantom-deps): find is a declared runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sasjs/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; phantom-dep heuristic false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash.groupby | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.18.4 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.17.4 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.17.3 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.17.1 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.17.0 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.16.2 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.16.0 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.13.1 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.13.0 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.12.15 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.12.12 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.12.11 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.12.9 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.12.6 | 20 / 27 | |
| 4.12.5 | 20 / 27 |
v4.18.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (allanbowe) on 2026-07-21, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.