@sasjs/core
Macros for SAS Application Developers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped @sasjs/core package with 6yr history; name similarity to 'cors' is coincidental, not impersonation. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 56)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.68.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.68.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.67.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.67.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.66.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.66.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.66.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.66.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.66.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.65.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.65.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.65.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.65.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.65.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.65.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.64.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.64.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.63.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.62.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.62.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.61.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.60.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.60.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.59.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.58.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.58.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.58.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.57.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.57.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.57.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.57.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.57.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.56.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.56.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 4.55.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 4.54.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 4.53.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 4.52.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 4.52.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 4.52.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 4.51.6 | 0 / 1 |
v4.68.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (allanbowe) on 2026-07-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.68.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (allanbowe) on 2026-07-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.56.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.56.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.55.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.54.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.53.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.52.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.52.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.52.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.51.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.