@scayle/h3-session
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Trusted org publisher with clean track record; likely CI environment change, not a supply-chain concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established SCAYLE org package; lack of Sigstore attestation is a process gap, not a security risk for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.0 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.6.3 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.6.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.4.2 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.4.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 7 |
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.