@sd-jwt/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:src/test/generalJSON.spec.ts | AI (source-diff): Encoded strings are SD-JWT test vectors (base64url JWTs); expected in this library's test suite. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD publish; dormancy is not indicative of takeover here. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): @sd-jwt/core is a scoped package in the OpenWallet Foundation SD-JWT monorepo; not a typosquat of cors. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.19.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.18.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.18.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.17.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.16.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.15.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.14.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.14.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.13.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.12.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.11.0 | 4 / 1 |
v0.19.0
2 findingsPackage name '@sd-jwt/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
2 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.0
2 findingsModified file contains 6 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.