@seafile/sdoc-file-view
This is a seafile database components
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Seafile org packages consistently lack Sigstore attestation; not a risk signal for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.63 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.62 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.61 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.60 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.59 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.58 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.57 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.56 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.55 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.54 | 10 / 86 | |
| 0.0.53 | 10 / 86 |
v0.0.63
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.61
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.59
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.58
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.56
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.