@sebspark/promise-cache
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA attestation is the documented CI/CD pattern for seb-oss/Spark-packages. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers appear to be org members of seb-oss; consistent with legitimate team expansion. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sebspark/otel | AI (dependencies): Same-org sibling package from seb-oss/Spark-packages; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 57)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.0.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 8.0.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 7.0.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 7.0.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 7.0.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 7.0.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 7.0.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.6.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.5.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.29 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.28 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.27 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.26 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.25 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.24 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.23 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.22 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.21 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.20 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.19 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.18 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.17 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.16 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.15 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.14 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.13 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.12 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.11 | 4 / 1 | |
| 6.4.10 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.9 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.8 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.4.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.3.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.3.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.3.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.2.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.2.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.2.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.2.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 6.2.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.2.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.2.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.2.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.1.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 6.1.2 | 3 / 4 |
v8.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.