← Home

@secretlint/secretlint-rule-vercel

npm Repository Homepage

A secretlint rule for Vercel

11
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

azu

Keywords

secretlinttestingrule

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Secretlint monorepo publishes via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; azu→GitHub Actions is the expected automated-publish pattern. ai
publish-pattern new-deps-added AI (publish-pattern): @secretlint/types and @textlint/regexp-string-matcher are established ecosystem deps; not suspicious for this package. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@textlint/regexp-string-matcher AI (dependencies): Established textlint utility; stable dependency of this package across versions. ai

Versions (showing 11 of 11)

Version Deps Published
13.0.2 2 / 5
13.0.0 2 / 5
12.3.1 2 / 5
12.3.0 2 / 5
12.2.0 2 / 5
12.1.0 2 / 5
12.0.1 2 / 5
12.0.0 2 / 5
11.7.1 2 / 5
11.6.0 2 / 5
0.0.1 0 / 0

v13.0.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v13.0.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v12.3.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v12.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: azu → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v12.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: azu → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v12.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: azu → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v12.0.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: azu → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v12.0.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: azu → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v11.7.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: azu → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v11.6.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: azu → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.