@seljs/schema
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped monorepo package from known org; sparse metadata is typical for early/stub releases, not spam. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped monorepo package from known org; missing description is cosmetic, not a risk signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 11 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 11 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 11 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 11 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 10 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.