@semcore/breakpoints
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Org-level transition from semrushinc to uikit-team; matches package author field and official Semrush repo. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Semrush UI-kit packages consistently lack provenance; stable pattern across the org. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 16.1.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 16.1.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.42.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.41.4 | 1 / 2 |
v16.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.42.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.41.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.