@semcore/spin
Semrush Spin Component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pino | AI (typosquat): Established Semrush UI component; scoped name @semcore/spin is unrelated to pino, false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 17.2.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 17.1.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 17.0.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 17.0.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 16.1.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 16.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 5.42.0 | 2 / 2 |
v17.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v17.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v17.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.42.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.