@servicenow/isomorphic-rollup
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:femtocolor | AI (dependencies): Optional dependency; no install scripts; low-risk color utility in a build tool context. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:rollup-plugin-livereload | AI (dependencies): Optional dev-server dependency; well-known rollup plugin; no install scripts. | ai |
v1.3.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (phaniprakash) than the most recent previously approved version (gouthami.pantangi) on 2026-06-05, but phaniprakash is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.