@shapediver/viewer.features.interaction
This is the npm package for the ShapeDiver Viewer interaction features. Please have a look at our [help desk section](https://help.shapediver.com/doc/interactions-part-1) for this feature.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 51 of 174)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.19.3 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.19.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.18.2 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.18.1 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.18.0 | 12 / 0 | |
| 3.17.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.10 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.9 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.8 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.7 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.6 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.5 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.4 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.3 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.2 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.1 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.16.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.12 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.11 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.10 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.9 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.8 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.7 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.6 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.5 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.4 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.3 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.2 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.1 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.15.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.10 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.9 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.8 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.7 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.6 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.5 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.4 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.3 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.2 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.1 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.14.0 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.20 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.19 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.18 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.17 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.16 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.15 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.14 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.13 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.12 | 10 / 0 | |
| 3.13.11 | 10 / 0 |
v3.19.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (michael_at_shapediver) on 2026-07-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.19.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (michael_at_shapediver) on 2026-07-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.