@shapediver/viewer.settings
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 1.2.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.2.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.2.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.2.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.2.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.1.8 | 2 / 7 | |
| 1.1.7 | 2 / 7 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.