@sharpee/if-domain
Core domain model and contracts for Sharpee Interactive Fiction Platform
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep is a sibling @sharpee/core from the same monorepo/publisher; not an external supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sharpee/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling dep; declared but may be re-exported rather than directly imported. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.113 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.111 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.110 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.109 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.107 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.106 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.105 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.104 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.103 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.102 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.101 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.100 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.99 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.98 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.97 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.96 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.95 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.93 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.92 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.91 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.90 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.89 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.88 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.87 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.86 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.84 | 1 / 0 |
v4.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on 2026-07-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.1.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.0.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.