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@sharpee/plugins

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Plugin contracts for Sharpee engine turn-cycle extensibility

42
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

chicagodavejohnesco

Keywords

interactive-fictionsharpeepluginsturn-cycle

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@sharpee/core AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; likely re-exported via index rather than directly imported. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@sharpee/world-model AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; likely re-exported via index rather than directly imported. ai

Versions (showing 42 of 42)

Version Deps Published
4.1.1 2 / 0
4.1.0 2 / 0
4.0.0 2 / 0
3.6.0 2 / 0
3.5.0 2 / 0
3.3.0 2 / 0
3.1.0 2 / 0
3.0.0 2 / 0
2.2.0 2 / 0
2.1.1 2 / 0
2.1.0 2 / 0
2.0.0 2 / 0
1.5.0 2 / 0
1.1.1 2 / 0
1.1.0 2 / 0
1.0.8 2 / 0
1.0.0 2 / 0
0.9.113 2 / 0
0.9.111 2 / 0
0.9.110 2 / 0
0.9.109 2 / 0
0.9.107 2 / 0
0.9.106 2 / 0
0.9.105 2 / 0
0.9.104 2 / 0
0.9.103 2 / 0
0.9.102 2 / 0
0.9.100 2 / 0
0.9.99 2 / 0
0.9.98 2 / 0
0.9.97 2 / 0
0.9.96 2 / 0
0.9.95 2 / 0
0.9.93 2 / 0
0.9.92 2 / 0
0.9.91 2 / 0
0.9.90 2 / 0
0.9.89 2 / 0
0.9.88 2 / 0
0.9.87 0 / 0
0.9.86 0 / 0
0.9.84 2 / 0

v4.1.1

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: chicagodave → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-27, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on 2026-07-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v4.1.0

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: chicagodave → GitHub Actions (on unknown date, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v4.0.0

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: chicagodave → GitHub Actions (on unknown date, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v3.6.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.5.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.5.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.