@sharpee/world-model
World model for Sharpee IF platform - entities, traits, and behaviors
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps are first-party @sharpee monorepo siblings, not third-party packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sharpee/core | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo sibling dep; declared but may be used transitively or via re-exports, not a real phantom. | ai |
Versions (showing 44 of 44)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.113 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.111 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.110 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.109 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.107 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.106 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.105 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.104 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.103 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.102 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.100 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.99 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.98 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.97 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.96 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.95 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.93 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.92 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.91 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.90 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.89 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.88 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.87 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.86 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.84 | 2 / 0 |
v4.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chicagodave) on 2026-07-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.