@shazow/whatsabi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): new Function() used as a data container in EVM disassembler, not for dynamic code execution. Stable pattern across versions. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-tlds | AI (semgrep): anyabi.xyz is a legitimate Ethereum ABI service referenced in a comment; not C2/exfiltration. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 0.24.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 0.22.2 | 1 / 11 |
v0.26.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.22.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.