@shell-shock/preset-script
A Shell Shock preset that generates a fully-featured script application.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher with SLSA attestation is a legitimate CI/CD automation pattern for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently published with SLSA provenance; stable signal for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stryke/helpers | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency; stable pattern for preset packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@powerlines/deepkit | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency; stable pattern for preset packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:defu | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency; stable pattern for preset packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stryke/string-format | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency; stable pattern for preset packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@powerlines/plugin-plugin | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency; stable pattern for preset packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@alloy-js/typescript | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency; stable pattern for preset packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stryke/path | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency; stable pattern for preset packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 80)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.70 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.6.69 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.6.68 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.6.67 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.6.66 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.6.65 | 15 / 1 | |
| 0.6.63 | 15 / 2 | |
| 0.6.62 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.61 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.60 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.59 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.58 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.57 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.56 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.55 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.54 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.53 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.52 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.51 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.50 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.49 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.48 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.47 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.46 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.45 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.44 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.43 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.42 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.41 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.40 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.39 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.38 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.37 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.36 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.35 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.34 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.33 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.32 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.31 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.30 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.29 | 15 / 3 | |
| 0.6.28 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.27 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.26 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.23 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.22 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.21 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.20 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.19 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.18 | 13 / 3 | |
| 0.6.17 | 13 / 3 |
v0.6.70
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.69
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.68
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.67
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.66
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (stormie-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-06-05, but stormie-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.6.65
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.63
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.62
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.61
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.60
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.59
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.58
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.57
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.56
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.52
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.51
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.50
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.49
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.48
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.47
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.46
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.45
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.44
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.43
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.42
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.41
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.40
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.38
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.37
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.36
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.35
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.34
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.33
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.32
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.31
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.30
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.29
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.27
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.