@shopify/theme-check-common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/checks/unique-settings-id/test-data.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long line is an inlined JSON test fixture string, not obfuscation; stable FP. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash-es | AI (phantom-deps): lodash-es used indirectly; declared dep is legitimate for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): CI publish via GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; gitHead absence benign for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:postcss | AI (phantom-deps): postcss used via config files; legit declared dep. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Shopify migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; this is the expected pattern for the org going forward. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer jaimie.way is consistent with a Shopify team member addition; no malicious signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 43 of 43)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.28.0 | 11 / 5 | |
| 3.27.0 | 11 / 5 | |
| 3.26.1 | 11 / 5 | |
| 3.26.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.25.1 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.25.0 | 11 / 3 | |
| 3.24.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.23.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.22.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.21.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.20.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.20.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.19.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.18.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.18.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.17.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.17.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.16.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.16.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.15.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.15.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.14.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.14.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.13.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.12.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.11.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.10.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.9.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.8.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.7.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.7.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.6.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.6.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.5.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 3.4.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.3.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.2.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.2.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.2.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.1.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 9 / 3 |
v3.28.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v3.27.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v3.26.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.17.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.14.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.7.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.