@shopify/ui-extensions
This package contains the public type definitions and utilities needed to create Shopify UI extensions.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@remote-ui/core | AI (dependencies): @remote-ui/core is Shopify's own remote-ui framework; legitimate dependency for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@remote-ui/async-subscription | AI (dependencies): @remote-ui/async-subscription is Shopify's own package; legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from shopify-dep to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing is a standard Shopify org migration, confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Package uses exports map as primary resolution; 15-byte main is a stub re-export pattern. Missing repo/keywords metadata is a hygiene issue only, not indicative of spam for this established Shopify package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:toplevel-fetch | AI (semgrep): Fetch call is in an example/documentation file showing Shopify Admin GraphQL API usage via shopify: protocol — not runtime library code or exfiltration. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ts-morph | AI (phantom-deps): ts-morph is used for docs/code-generation tooling in this package, consistent with the docs:* scripts. Not a security concern for a Shopify-published package. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.4.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.4.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.4.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.4.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.1.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.1.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.1.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.1.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2026.1.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.11.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.15 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.14 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.13 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.12 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.11 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.10 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.9 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.8 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.7 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.6 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.5 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.10.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 2025.8.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2025.7.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2025.7.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2025.7.2 | 2 / 3 |
v2026.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.10.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2025.10.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2025.10.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2025.10.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2025.10.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2025.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.7.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.7.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2025.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.