@signageos/front-applet
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/bundle.js | AI (source-diff): Encoded strings are lodash minified bundle constants; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.8.0 | 0 / 37 | |
| 8.7.0 | 0 / 37 | |
| 8.6.0 | 0 / 37 | |
| 8.2.4 | 0 / 37 |
v8.8.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (vasekboch) than the most recent previously approved version (signageos.io) on 2026-06-04, but vasekboch is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v8.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.6.0
2 findingsModified file contains 7 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.