@silo-storage/sdk-react
[Read the Docs](https://silo.evanyu.dev/docs/sdk/react)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish to GitHub Actions CI/CD, confirmed by SLSA Sigstore attestation on the same repo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:tus-js-client | AI (dependencies): tus-js-client is a well-established resumable upload library; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.2.9 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.8 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.6 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.5 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.4 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.3 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.8 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.6 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 9 |
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.