@simlin/mcp-linux-x64
Platform binary for @simlin/mcp (linux-x64)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is standard for platform-specific binary stub packages in the optionalDependencies pattern. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): No deps, no keywords, tiny payload are all expected for a platform binary stub package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform binary package; binary is the intended deliverable, attested via SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/simlin-mcp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.