@sinch/sdk-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sinch/sms | AI (dependencies): First-party Sinch SDK monorepo package; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sinch/voice | AI (dependencies): First-party Sinch SDK monorepo package; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Sinch SDK publisher; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.3 | 8 / 0 | |
| 1.4.2 | 8 / 0 | |
| 1.4.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 1.4.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 1.3.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 1.2.1 | 7 / 0 |
v1.4.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.